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Abstract
We study a DeGroot-like opinion dynamics model in which agents may oppose other agents. As an
underlying motivation, in our setup, agents want to adjust their opinions to match those of the agents
of their ‘in-group’ and, in addition, they want to adjust their opinions to match the ‘inverse’ of those of
the agents of their ‘out-group’. Our paradigm can account for persistent disagreement in connected
societies as well as bi- and multi-polarization. Outcomes depend upon network structure and the
choice of deviation function modeling the mode of opposition between agents. For a particular choice
of deviation function, which we call soft opposition, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
long-run polarization. We also consider social influence (who are the opinion leaders in the network?)
as well as the question of wisdom in our na¨ıve learning paradigm, finding that wisdom is difficult to
attain when there exist sufficiently strong negative relations between agents.1
1 Introduction
On many economic, political, social, and religious agendas, disagreement among individuals is pervasive.
For example, the following are or have been highly debated: whether abortion, gay marriage, or death
penalty should be legalized or not; whether Iraq had weapons of mass destructions; the scientific standing
of evolution; whether taxes/social subsidies/unemployment benefits/(lower bounds on) wages should be
increased or decreased; the right course of government in general; the effectiveness of alternative (or
‘standard’) medicine such as homeopathy.2 In fact, in certain contexts such as the political arena,
disagreement is ‘built into’ and essential part of the system of opinion exchange (Jones, 1995; Cohen,
2003). Yet, contradicting this factual basis, it has been observed that the phenomenon of disagreement
is not among the predictions of renown and widely used theoretical models of opinion dynamics in the
social and economic context.3 Namely, in these models, a standard prediction is that agents tend toward
a consensus opinion, that is, that all agents eventually hold the same opinion (or belief)4 about any
specific issue. Typically, this applies to both (fully rational) Bayesian frameworks — which is the reason
why Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) call them “[no] natural framework[s] for understanding persisent
disagreement” (p. 6) — and non-Bayesian (boundedly rational) setups such as the famous DeGroot
model of opinion dynamics (DeGroot, 1974), where consensus obtains as long as the social network
wherein agents communicate with each other is strongly connected (and aperiodic).
Concerning the non-Bayesian DeGroot model, as we consider in this work, a few amendments have
more recently been suggested which are capable of producing disagreement among agents. In one strand
of literature, models including a homophily mechanism, whereby agents limit their communication to
individuals whose opinions are not too different from their own, can reproduce patterns of opinion diver-
sity and disagreement (Deffuant et al., 2000; Hegselmann and Krause, 2002). In another strand, Daron
Acemoglu and colleagues (cf. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011) introduce two types of agents, regular and
stubborn, whereby the latter never update their opinions but ‘stubbornly’ retain their old beliefs, which
1Earlier and more verbose working paper versions of this article can be found at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1306.3134 and
the author’s personal website.
2Our examples are, i.a., taken from Abramowitz and Saunders (2005), Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011), and Golub and
Jackson (2012).
3See, e.g., the discussions Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011); Acemoglu et al. (2013). See also Abelson (1964).
4Typically, in the literature, the term belief is used when there exists a truth for an agenda, and the term opinion is
used when truth is not explicitly modeled. Like our related work, we more generally subsume under the term opinions also
beliefs, judgements, estimations, or even norms and values, depending on the application scenario.
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may be considered an autarky condition. Multiple stubborn agents with distinct opinions on a certain
agenda may then draw society toward distinct opinion clusters. Such stubborn agents, it is argued, may
appear in the form of opinion leaders, (propaganda) media, or political parties that wish to influence
others without receiving any feedback from them. As a solution to the disagreement problem, however,
both of these model types rely on a problematic ‘disconnectedness condition’, insofar as disagreement
only obtains when there is no (uni- or bilateral) information flow between certain subclasses of agents.
In this work, we investigate an alternative explanation of disagreement, which can also explain dis-
agreement in connected societies. We consider a non-Bayesian DeGroot-like opinion dynamics model in
which agents are related to each other via two types of links. One link type represents the degree or
intensity of relationship between agents and is given by nonnegative real numbers. The other link type
represents whether agents follow or oppose (deviate from) each other, that is, it represents the kind of
relationship between agents. We assume that group identity causes agents to follow their in-group mem-
bers and to deviate from their out-group members. In-group favoritism and out-group discrimination are
important and well-established notions in social psychology (see, for instance, Tajfel et al., 1971; Brewer,
1979; Castano et al., 2002). They have also more recently been included in economists’ models (e.g., in an
experimental context, Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini, 2007; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Chen and Li, 2009;
Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Fehrler and Kosfeld, 2013; Tsutsui and Zizzo, 2014). Experimentally,
it has been shown that even minimal group identities, induced by a random labeling of groups, may lead
to intergroup discrimination. When group membership is more salient, Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini
(2007) show that there is much more cooperation between in-group members than between out-group
members in a prisoner’s dilemma game, and Fehrler and Kosfeld (2013) show that individuals associating
with particular NGOs (non-governmental organizations) strongly discriminate against out-group mem-
bers (those that do not associate with an NGO) in a trust game.5 Analogously, we assume that agents
want to coordinate with their in-group members (have negative utility from holding different opinions
than in-group members) and want to anti-coordinate with their out-group members (have negative utility
from not deviating from the opinions that their out-group members hold).6 A special case of our model is
when an agent opposes everyone but himself, i.e., his in-group is himself and his out-group is all ‘the rest’.
In some works, such agents have been referred to as rebels or anti-conformists in contrast to conformists
(Jackson, 2009; Cao et al., 2011; Javarone, 2014; Jarman et al., 2015).
Our model closely follows the literature on learning through communication in a given social network
(cf. DeGroot (1974); DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003); Golub and Jackson (2010); Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi (2010); Buechel, Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner (2015)). There, the standard
assumption is that agents learn from others in a na¨ıve manner, not properly accounting for the repetition
of opinion signals, which DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) call ‘persuasion bias’. A now classical
argument is that if all agents’ initial beliefs/opinions were independent and unbiased estimates of the true
value (of a discussion topic), then taking a weighted average of the agents’ beliefs in one’s social network
(where the weights are proportional to the inverses of the beliefs’ variances) is an optimal aggregation
strategy. Then, continuing to average — in order to incorporate more remote information, e.g., from
friends of friends — in the same manner is a boundedly rational heuristic that treats the evolving
information signals as novel, not accounting for their cross-contamination. Such a heuristic aggregation
of opinion signals appears quite plausible given the processing costs involved in exact inference in this
setup (cf. Golub and Jackson, 2010). Also, recent experimental evaluations find that the na¨ıve DeGroot
model is a much better approximation of information aggregation in network interactions than ‘fully
rational’ Bayesian approaches and that individuals are indeed affected by persuasion bias (Corazzini et
al., 2012). In our model, we posit that agents are subject to the same biases involving processing of cross-
contaminated information and are, in addition, susceptible to in-group bias, attempting to coordinate
5In a ‘field’ setting, the in-group/out-group distinction may prominently be seen as arising, e.g., in a (main stream)
culture/counterculture (e.g., hippies, punks, etc.) dichotomy (Yinger, 1977) or in classical party divisions (e.g., Republicans
vs. Democrats) in the field of politics, etc.
6Out-group discrimination (opposition) is also closely related to what has been termed rejection of beliefs, actions,
and values of dissimilar/disliked others. According to this concept, agents change their normative systems to become
more dissimilar to interaction partners they dislike (cf. Abelson, 1964; Kitts, 2006; Tsuji, 2002; cf. also Groeber, Lorenz,
and Schweitzer, 2013) insofar as disliked others may serve as ‘negative referents’ who inspire contrary behavior. While in
controlled experiments Taka´cs, Flache, and Ma¨s (2014) do not find strong evidence for the tenet that individuals disassociate
from the opinions of a disliked source, their study explicitly excludes a group identity structure. Moreover, as the authors
argue, their laboratory experiment may have “suppressed the emotional processes that in field settings induce disliking and
rejection of others’ opinions.”
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with in-group members and to anti-coordinate with out-group members.7
This work is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and gives two introductory exam-
ples. Sections 3 and 4 present our main results, on persistent disagreement (Theorem 3.1) and bi- and
multi-polarization (Proposition 3.1). For a special case of our model, we derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for long-run polarization (Theorem 4.1) as well as opinion leadership (Theorem 4.2) as further
main results. In Section 5, we summarize and conclude with a discussion on wisdom. To make this work
more or less self-contained, we provide concepts, e.g., from graph and matrix theory in the appendix, to
which we also relegate all our proofs.
2 Model
Let S be a finite set (‘discrete model’) or a subset of the real numbers (‘continuous model’), which we
refer to as opinion spectrum.8 Let n ≥ 1 and let [n] = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents. Consider the
normal form game ([n], S1 × · · · × Sn, U), where
• [n] is the set of players,
• S = S1 = · · · = Sn is the action set of each player,
• and U = (u1, . . . , un), where ui : S
n → R is the payoff/utility function of player i ∈ [n].
Let F be the identity function on S — that is, F(x) = x for all x ∈ S — and let D be a function D : S → S
that is not the identity function, and which we term deviation function (in the most general form of our
model, we let deviation functions D depend on particular agents i and j involved, that is, we subscript
D as in Di or Dij). We assume that agents are connected via a (social) network W, where Wij ≥ 0
denotes the strength of relationship between agents i and j.9 More precisely, Wij signals the degree of
importance of agent j for agent i, and we do not require W to be symmetric, that is, Wij and Wji may
differ. Assume that Wii = 0 and
∑n
j=1Wij = 1, for all i ∈ [n].
10 Assume further that player i has payoff
for action profile (b1, . . . , bn)
ui(b1, . . . , bn) = −
∑
j∈In(i)
Wij(bi − F(bj))
2 −
∑
j∈Out(i)
Wij(bi −D(bj))
2 (2.1)
for the continuous model. Here, In(i) ⊆ [n] is the in-group (set of friends) of player i and Out(i) ⊆ [n] is
the out-group (set of enemies) of player i. For the discrete model, assume that the analogous payoff is
ui(b1, . . . , bn) = −
∑
j:j∈In(i),bi 6=F(bj)
Wij −
∑
j:j∈Out(i),bi 6=D(bj)
Wij . (2.2)
Utility functions ui in Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2) say that player i has disutility from choosing a different
action than his friends and has disutility from choosing a different action than the ‘opposite’ action of
his enemies, where D specifies what the opposite of an action is.
When each agent repeatedly plays a best response to the actions — which in our setup are opinions
— of the other players, i.e., i ∈ [n] chooses action bi that maximizes ui(·), then, in the continuous model,
opinions evolve over time according to the following weighted average of (possibly, via D, ‘inverted’) past
opinions:
bi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈In(i)
Wijbj(t) +
∑
j∈Out(i)
WijD(bj(t)) =
n∑
j=1
WijFij(bj(t)), (2.3)
7If one wanted to construct an argument that closely follows that of DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003), one might
posit that, in our model, agents ‘correct’ their out-group members’ opinion signals — possibly because of distrust — before
averaging.
8For the continous DeGroot model as we discuss, S is typically modeled as a convex subset of the real numbers, that is,∑
j αjxj ∈ S for all finite numbers of elements xj ∈ S and all weights αj ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
j αj = 1. For convenience, we
think of S as the whole of R or of some (closed and bounded) interval [α, β] for α ≤ β.
9Throughout, we denote the entries of a vector u as ui or [u]i and analogously for matrices.
10The assumption Wii = 0 can be relaxed, see Groeber, Lorenz, and Schweitzer (2013). In subsequent sections, we do not
always assume that Wii = 0.
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for t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., starting from some particular initial actions bi(0). Here, Fij ∈ {F,D}, depending
on whether j is in i’s in-group or out-group, respectively. For the discrete model, the analogous best
response action is weighted majority voting of agents’ (possibly inverted) past opinions:
bi(t+ 1) = argmax
s∈S


n∑
j=1
Wij1
(
Fij(bj(t)), s
) , (2.4)
where 1(r, t) = 1 if r = t and zero otherwise. Casting the updating processes (2.3) and (2.4) in a more
compact ‘operator’ notation, we write (F being the n× n ‘matrix’ with entries Fij)
b(t+ 1) = (W ⊙ F)(b(t)). (2.5)
Here, we let the ‘operator’ W ⊙ F act on a vector b ∈ Sn in the manner prescribed in (2.3) and (2.4),
i.e.,
[
(W ⊙ F)(b)
]
i
def
=
∑n
j=1Wij · Fij(bj) and analogously for the discrete model.
11 Equation (2.5) may
again be rewritten as
b(t) = (W ⊙ F)t(b(0)), (2.6)
by which we denote the t-fold application of operator W ⊙ F on b(0), that is, f t(b) = f(· · · f(f(b))),
where f =W ⊙ F. In the sequel, we refer to W ⊙ F as ‘operator’ or ‘social network’.
Remark 2.1. In case F is the n×n matrix of identity functions, updating process (2.6) collapses to the
standard DeGroot learning model where (W ⊙ F)t is simply the t-th matrix power of matrix W. From
an alternative (equivalent) viewpoint, our model generalizes the standard DeGroot model insofar as the
latter posits that Out(i) = ∅ for all i ∈ [n].
We note that since the operator W ⊙ F in opinion updating process (2.5) retrieves best responses
of agents to an opinion profile b(t), under utility functions ui(·) as in (2.1) or (2.2), the fixed-points of
W⊙F — that is, the points b such that (W⊙F)(b) = b — are the Nash equilibria of the normal form
games ([n], Sn, U(·)). Namely, for each such a fixed-point, all players in [n] play best responses to the
other players’ actions (opinions).
We now illustrate our model with two examples, outlining its relationship to other models discussed
in the literature and hinting at its potential for long-run disagreement.
Example 2.1. Let S = {0, 1} be a binary opinion space. Assume that
D(x) =
{
1 if x = 0,
0 if x = 1.
Let Wij =
1
|N(i)| , where N(i) denotes the set of neighbors of agent i in the social networks, i.e., the set
of agents j for which Wij > 0. When Fij = F for all j ∈ [n], and agent i updates opinions according
to (2.4), then, at each time step, agent i chooses the majority opinion among his neighbors’ opinions.
Such individuals have also been called ‘conformists’ in some contexts; e.g., Jackson (2009); Cao et al.
(2011); Javarone (2014); Jarman et al. (2015). Conversely, when Fij = D for all j ∈ [n], and agent i
updates opinions according to (2.4), then, at each time step, agent i chooses the minority opinion (=
majority of inverted opinions) among his neighbors’ opinions. Such individuals have also been called
‘anti-conformists’ or ‘rebels’. When weights are non-uniform and/or agents follow some of their peers
while deviating from others, then the current setup may yield interesting generalizations of the basic
conformist/non-conformist model.12
11For short, we will usually write (W ⊙F)b instead of (W ⊙ F)(b).
12 It is also worthy to note that binary opinion spaces (in a conformist/anti-conformist setup) are closely related to games
on networks (cf. Jackson, 2009 and references therein) with binary action spaces. In a society with only anti-conformists
on simple graphs (undirected graphs with no self-loops), maximally independent sets S ⊆ [n] of agents for which it holds
that Wi,S =
∑
j∈S Wij > 1/2 for all i ∈ [n]\S form pure strategy Nash equilibria of the underlying games in the sense that
assigning one action/opinion to all agents in S and the complementary action/opinion to all agents in [n]\S constitutes a
setting where each agent plays a best response to the actions/opinions of the others. In a society with both conformists
and anti-conformists, (pure strategy) Nash equilibria exist on networks in which each agent assigns weight mass > 1/2 to
conformists: an equilibrium is where all the conformists take one action (hold one opinion), and all the anti-conformists the
other (cf. Jackson, 2009, p.272).
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Example 2.2. In this example, we let S = [−1, 1] and think of the opinion x = −1 as extreme left-wing
opinion, x = +1 as extreme right-wing opinion and of opinions −1 < x < 1 as more moderate opinions
(x = 0 as ‘center’ opinion). Assume there are six individuals, organized in four groups A, B, C, D,
members of each of which follow members of their own group and deviate from the members of the other
groups. Hence, let [n] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, A = {1, 2}, B = {3}, C = {4, 5}, D = {6}, and
Out(1) = Out(2) = {3, 4, 5, 6}, Out(3) = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6},
Out(4) = Out(5) = {1, 2, 3, 6}, Out(6) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Assume the following specification of deviation functions for members in each group of agents:
DA(x) = 1, DB(x) = −1, DC(x) =
x
2
,
DD,AB(x) = −x, DD,C(x) = sgn(x)
√
|x|,
(2.7)
for all x ∈ [−1, 1]. Put differently, agents in group A ignore the actual opinion signals of members of their
out-groups, simply interpreting any uttered opinion of an out-group individual as evidence of the opinion
1. Similarly, agents in group B interpret any opinion signal uttered by an out-group agent as evidence
for opinion −1. Agents in group C are moderate in that they ‘discount’ (extreme) viewpoints that their
out-group members hold. Finally, agents in group D more literally invert the opinions of members of
(their out-)groups A and B — possibly knowing of these agents’ predispositions for extreme opinions of
particular kinds. Moreover, they map the opinions of members of (their out-)group C to more extreme
opinions for any value of x between −1 and 1 — possibly knowing of these agents’ biases toward moderate
opinions. According to this specification, matrix F looks as follows:
F =


F F DA DA DA DA
F F DA DA DA DA
DB DB F DB DB DB
DC DC DC F F DC
DC DC DC F F DC
DD,AB DD,AB DD,AB DD,C DD,C F


.
In Figure 1, we plot sample opinion dynamics when agents start with the initial consensus b(0) =
(µ, . . . , µ)⊺, where µ = 1/4, and for an arbitrarily selected positive row-stochastic matrix W ∈ R6×6.
Note how, in this case, agents’ opinions polarize into extreme and moderate viewpoints and note how the
opinion dynamics process (apparently) converges and stabilizes as time progresses. In the same figure,
we also sketch the deviation functions defined in Equation (2.7).
3 Persistent disagreement, bi- and multipolarization
In this section, we consider our extended DeGroot model in the abstract situation of arbitrary deviation
functions D. Our results in this context concern the possible consensus opinions that agents may hold
in our model in the long-run (Theorem 3.1). We will find that the long-run consensus vectors can
be determined quite simply: under appropriate weight conditions, a certain consensus opinion vector
(c, . . . , c) is an equilibrium if and only if c is a (D-)neutral opinion with respect to each agent’s deviation
function D, i.e., D maps the opinion c to itself. This is our persistent disagreement result: as long as there
exist (sufficiently strong) out-group relations between agents, society will disagree forever if there is no
opinion which is neutral for each agent, no matter the agents’ initial opinions. After investigating long-run
persistent disagreement, we consider a particular form of disagreement, namely, bi- and multi-polarization
(for abstract and arbitrary deviation functions D).
To begin with our formal analysis, we define a few concepts. Let C be the set of consensus opinion
vectors in Sn, i.e.,
C = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ S
n | a1 = · · · = an}.
Let Y be an arbitrary set and let Q be an arbitrary function Q : Y → Y . By Fix(Q), we denote the set
of fixed-points of Q, that is, the set of all x ∈ Y such that Q(x) = x. For a deviation function D, we call
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Figure 1: Left: Deviation functions DA, DB, DC , and DD,AB, DD,C specified in the Equation (2.7), as
well as identity function F, on S = [−1, 1]. Right: Opinion dynamics for the society described in the
example, starting from the initial consensus (1/4, . . . , 1/4) at time 0. Agents 1 and 2 belong to group A,
agent 3 makes up group B, agents 4 and 5 belong to group C, and agent 6 makes up group D. Weights
Wij set to arbitrary positive values.
an opinion x ∈ S for which D(x) = x (D-)neutral. Let A ⊆ [n] be an arbitrary subset of the set of agents
and let i ∈ [n] be a particular agent. We denote by Wi,A :=
∑
j∈AWij the total weight mass i assigns to
group A.
Theorem 3.1. Let W ⊙ F be an arbitrary social network such that Fij ∈ {F,Di}, for all i, j ∈ [n].
Assume that either W⊙F refers to the discrete model or that each function Fij in F is continuous. Let
A = {i ∈ [n] |Wi,Out(i) > C0} denote the set of agents whose weight mass assigned to out-group members
exceeds a particular threshold C0; in the discrete case, C0 =
1
2 , and in the continuous case, C0 = 0. Then:
P1[Lim(W ⊙ F) ∩ C] =
⋂
i∈A
Fix(Di),
where Lim(W ⊙ F) = {b ∈ Sn |b = limt→∞(W ⊙ F)tb(0), for some b(0) ∈ Sn} denotes the set of
opinion profiles b ∈ Sn that may result in the limit of opinion updating process (2.6). Moreover, P1
projects consensus vectors (c, . . . , c) ∈ Sn on their first coordinate c ∈ S. If A is the empty set, we let⋂
i∈A Fix(Di) = S.
Remark 3.1. One of the implications of Theorem 3.1 is persistent disagreement, under the assump-
tions of the theorem and further rather mild conditions, as a prediction of our generalized DeGroot
updating process (2.6). Namely, in particular, the relation
⋂
i∈A Fix(Di) = ∅ follows when, for instance:
• One agent’s deviation function is radical : Fix(Di) = ∅.
• Two agents’ assessment of what constitutes a neutral opinion differs: Fix(Di) ∩ Fix(Dj) = ∅.
More generally, persistent disagreement follows whenever the agents in society have no common
interpretation of neutrality: there exists no opinion c ∈ S such that c is Di-neutral for all agents i.
Moreover, concerning deviation functions D, our only assumption was that there are points which they do
not fix. Modeling deviation, however, a plausible (stronger) restriction on D is that D(x) 6= x for many,
most, or all x ∈ S. Thus, potential long-run agreement, that is,
⋂
i∈A Fix(Di) 6= ∅, would be particularly
difficult to obtain, because this consists of a condition that is unlikely on the level of individual agents,
and in addition contains a cross-agent constraint that deviation functions would have to fix the same
point(s) x ∈ S for all agents.
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Example 3.1. We apply Theorem 3.1 to the examples discussed previously. In Example 2.1, Fix(D) = ∅,
so in a conformist/anti-conformist society, consensus cannot ensue if at least one agent opposes more than
half of his social network.
In Example 2.2, Fix(DA) = {1}, Fix(DB) = {−1}, Fix(DC) = Fix(DD,AB) = {0}, and Fix(DD,C) =
{0, 1,−1}. While Theorem 3.1 does not directly apply to Example 2.2, since agent 6’s deviation functions
vary across out-group agents, we can nonetheless apply the theorem to the society consisting of agents
1 through 5 and conclude that reaching a consensus is not possible for this subsociety since, e.g., ∅ =
{1} ∩ {−1} (and assuming that respective weights satisfy the positivity assumption outlined in the
theorem). Hence, since agents 1 to 5 cannot reach a consensus, then also agents 1 to 6 — the overall
society in the example — cannot reach a consensus.
Polarization
We now investigate (bi-)polarization as an outcome of our opinion updating dynamics. We call an
opinion vector p ∈ Sn a (bi-)polarization if p consists of two elements a, b ∈ S exclusively, that is, if
[p]i ∈ {a, b} for all i = 1, . . . , n. Note that according to our definition, a consensus vector is a special case
of a polarization. We first define network structures that are sufficient for inducing polarization opinion
vectors.
Definition 3.1 (Opposition bipartite operatorW⊙F). We call the operatorW⊙F opposition bipartite
if there exists a partition (N1,N2) of the set of agents [n] into two disjoint subsets — [n] = N1 ∪ N2,
with N1 ∩ N2 = ∅ — such that agents in Nk follow each other, for k = 1, 2, while for all agents i ∈ Nk,
j ∈ N−k, for k = 1, 2, it holds that i deviates from j. More precisely, we require
∀ i, i′ ∈ Nk
(
Wii′ > 0 =⇒ i
′ ∈ In(i)
)
, for k = 1, 2,
∀ i ∈ Nk, j ∈ N−k
(
Wij > 0 =⇒ j ∈ Out(i)
)
, for k = 1, 2.
Remark 3.2. Note that our above definition of opposition bipartiteness is equivalent to the condition
that (1) no two agents within each subsociety are enemies of each other and that (2) no two agents across
the two subsocieties are friends of each other.
Also note that we do not necessarily require N1 and N2 to be non-empty. Therefore, the standard
DeGroot model (with exclusively friendship relationships) constitutes a special case of an opposition
bipartite network in which N1 = [n] and N2 = ∅.
Remark 3.3. What we call ‘opposition bipartite’ operator — or at least a special case of our concept
— has also been called ‘balanced signed network’ in the literature (cf. Beasley and Kleinberg, 2010).
Definition 3.2 (Reverse opposition bipartite operator W ⊙ F). We call the operator W ⊙ F reverse
opposition bipartite if there exists a partition (N1,N2) of the set of agents [n] into two disjoint subsets
such that agents in Nk deviate from each other, for k = 1, 2, while for all agents i ∈ Nk, j ∈ N−k, for
k = 1, 2, it holds that i follows j. More precisely, we require
∀ i, i′ ∈ Nk
(
Wii′ > 0 =⇒ i
′ ∈ Out(i)
)
, for k = 1, 2,
∀ i ∈ Nk, j ∈ N−k
(
Wij > 0 =⇒ j ∈ In(i)
)
, for k = 1, 2.
An example of an opposition bipartite operator is given in Example 3.2 below. An example of a
reverse opposition bipartite operator is given in Example 3.3 below. A schematic illustration of both
concepts is given in Figure 2.
Clearly, opposition bipartite networks have polarization opinion vectors as equilibria, when agents in
the same group hold one opinion and agents in the alternative group hold the ‘opposite’ opinion, as we
illustrate below.
Example 3.2. Let W be arbitrary row-stochastic. Consider
F =


F F D D
F F D D
D D F F
D D F F

 .
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Figure 2: Schematic illustration of the concepts of opposition bipartite (left) and reverse opposition
bipartite operators (right). We omit network links referring to weights W for clarity and we also draw
links as undirected for the same reason. We omit links Fij where Wij = 0. Red links denote opposition
(D), green links following (F).
Clearly, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite; for example, take N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, 4}. Moreover,
let S = {“impossible”,“unlikely”,“possible”,“likely”,“certain”} and let, e.g., “unlikely” and “likely” be
D-opposing viewpoints, i.e., D(a) = b and D(b) = a for a =“unlikely” and b =“likely”. Then
p =


“unlikely”
“unlikely”
“likely”
“likely”


is a polarization fixed-point of W ⊙ F.
Reverse opposition bipartite networks may induce oscillating, or fluctuating, opinion updates (cf.
Kramer, 1971), very similar to ordinary periodic networks.
Example 3.3. Let W be arbitrary row-stochastic. Consider
F =


D D F F
D D F F
F F D D
F F D D

 .
Clearly,W⊙F is reverse opposition bipartite; for example, take N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, 4}. For p and
D as in Example 3.2, we have

“unlikely”
“unlikely”
“likely”
“likely”

 7→W⊙F


“likely”
“likely”
“unlikely”
“unlikely”

 7→W⊙F


“unlikely”
“unlikely”
“likely”
“likely”

 7→W⊙F . . .
Also, note that in this example self-weights Wii may be zero for all agents i, so that agents do not
necessarily have to deviate from their own opinions in order for reverse opposition bipartiteness to be
satisfied.13
Next, we turn from bi-polarization to multi-polarization in which an opinion vector p ∈ Sn consists
of K distinct opinions s1, . . . , sK . We generalize our notion of opposition bipartite networks.
Definition 3.3 (Opposition multi-partite operator W ⊙ F). We call the operator W ⊙ F opposition
K-partite if there exists a partition (N1, . . . ,NK), for K ≥ 2, of the set of agents [n] into disjoint subsets
— [n] = N1 ∪ · · · ∪ NK , with Nk ∩ Nℓ = ∅ for all k 6= ℓ — such that agents in Nk follow each other,
for k = 1, . . . ,K, while for all agents i ∈ Nk, j ∈ Nℓ with k 6= ℓ, it holds that i deviates from j. More
13In fact, in reverse opposition bipartite networks we have either Wii = 0 or we have Wii > 0 and Fii = D, while in
opposition bipartite networks we have either Wii = 0 or we have Wii > 0 and Fii = F.
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precisely, we require
∀ i, i′ ∈ Nk
(
Wii′ > 0 =⇒ i
′ ∈ In(i)
)
, for k = 1, . . . ,K,
∀ i ∈ Nk, j ∈ Nℓ
(
Wij > 0 =⇒ j ∈ Out(i)
)
, for k 6= ℓ.
We also call an opposition K-partite operator opposition multi-partite.
Opposition multi-partite networks admit multi-polarizations as outcomes, as a simple generalization
of Example 3.2.
Proposition 3.1. Let W ⊙ F be an opposition K-partite, for K ≥ 2, social network. Moreover, let F
be such that Fij ∈ {F,D1, . . . ,DK} for deviation functions D1, . . . ,DK that precisely correspond to the
K groups society is made up of (that is, agents in group k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, apply deviation function Dk).
Let s1, . . . , sK ∈ S be such that
Dk(sℓ) = sk, ∀ k 6= ℓ.
Then, there exists a multi-polarization opinion vector p consisting of opinions s1, . . . , sK , that is, [p]i ∈
{s1, . . . , sK}, such that (W ⊙ F)p = p.
Example 3.4. For a concrete example, let S = {L,M,R} and consider three different groups with
distinct deviation functions D1(x) = L, D2(x) = M , D3(x) = R for all x ∈ {L,M,R}. Group 1 may
be thought of as always deviating to a left wing opinion, provided that its members deviate from certain
agents; group 2 to a moderate position in the opinion spectrum; and group 3 to a right wing position.
Let, e.g., n = 6, W be arbitrary row-stochastic, and let
F =


F F F D1 D1 D1
F F F D1 D1 D1
F F F D1 D1 D1
D2 D2 D2 F D2 D2
D3 D3 D3 D3 F F
D3 D3 D3 D3 F F


.
Clearly,W⊙F is opposition 3-partite (see also Figure 3). It is easy to check that, e.g., p = (L,L, L,M,R,R)
is a fixed-point of W ⊙ F, in accordance with the proposition.
1
2 3
4
5
6
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of Example 3.4. Groups have individualized deviation functions, in
different colors. We omit many links for clarity.
We omit the introduction of reverse opposition K-partite networks, for K ≥ 2, as a straightforward
generalization of reverse opposition bipartite networks. The generalization is along the lines of the
generalization of opposition K-partite networks over opposition bipartite ones.
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4 Continuous linear deviation functions
We now consider the situation when deviation functions take the affine-linear form
D(x) = a · x+ b, (4.1)
for a, b ∈ R. When deviation functions are of this form and when agents are in addition homogeneous
with respect to their deviation functions, i.e., D does not vary across agents, then the operator W ⊙ F
admits a particularly simple form, namely, that of an affine-linear operator; see Proposition A.2 in the
appendix. Moreover, we consider here the special case when a = −1 and b = 0.14 We consider such D
on opinion spectra S0 that are either of the form [−β, β] for some β > 0 or of the form S = R. We call
this D defined on such opinion spectra soft opposition.15 In this case, social networks W ⊙ F may be
represented by a matrix A that has entries Wij iff j ∈ In(i) and entries −Wij iff j ∈ Out(i).
4.1 A graph theoretical description
In the remainder, we consider the situation when graphs (i) contain no self-loops and are undirected
(simple) in the sense that Wij =Wji and Fij = Fji,
16 (ii) contain at most one type of deviation function
D across all agents, and (iii) when D is linear on the opinion spectrum S0; in particular, D is soft
opposition. When networks W ⊙ F are so specified, then, as before, W ⊙ F admits a linear matrix
representation A where A is in addition symmetric: A⊺ = A. We denote this class of networks by
SLS(S0) (for S imple, Linear, Soft opposition, and where the argument refers to the opinion spectrum),
that is,
SLS(S0) = {W ⊙ F | ∀i, j ∈ [n]
(
Wii = 0, Fij ∈ {F,D}, D soft opposition on S0,
Wij =Wji, Fij = Fji
)
}
denotes the class of social networks on agent sets [n] that satisfy simplicity, symmetricity, etc., as de-
scribed.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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3
4
5
6
7
Figure 4: Balanced and imbalanced networks. The left network is opposition bipartite (balanced) while
the right is neither opposition bipartite nor reverse opposition bipartite. In particular, agents 3 and 4
have mutual ‘friends’ (agents 1, 2) while agent 6 is in 3’s out-group and 4’s in-group. Alternatively:
agents 4 and 6, from different positively linked factions, have befriended each other.
We make an additional technical assumption here and in the remainder, namely, we generally assume
that the social networks wherein agents interact are aperiodic, that is, the greatest common divisor of the
lengths of their simple cycles is 1. Our main theorem in this context exhaustively categorizes long-run
opinions in terms of three different social network structures as outlined in the theorem. In the theorem,
recall that a graph G is said to be (strongly) connected if there exists a path in G from any node to any
other node. Moreover, in the theorem, we say that W ⊙ F is convergent if W ⊙ F is convergent for all
14The case |a| > 1 usually implies that opinions ‘explode’ over time because agents ‘overscale’ their out-group members’
opinions while |a| < 1 usually implies that society reaches a ‘zero consensus’ because agents iteratively discount their
out-group members’ opinions.
15We call such D soft opposition because opinions are inverted the less strongly the closer they are to the neutral consensus
zero. In our working paper version, we also define a (discontinuous) deviation function called hard opposition that maps
opinions to extreme inverted values of the opinion spectrum, depending on whether they are positive or negative (depending
on which side of the opinion spectrum they lie, with 0 as reference point).
16This captures reciprocity : amity and enmity are mutual.
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initial opinion vectors b(0) ∈ Sn, that is, limt→∞(W ⊙ F)tb(0) exists for all b(0) ∈ Sn. We say that
W ⊙ F induces a consensus if W ⊙ F induces a consensus for all initial opinion vectors b(0) ∈ Sn, that
is,W⊙F is convergent and limt→∞(W⊙F)tb(0) is always a consensus. We say that W⊙F is divergent
if it is not convergent. In other words, W ⊙ F is divergent when there exists a vector b(0) such that
limt→∞(W⊙F)tb(0) does not exist. We say that W⊙F induces a polarization if limt→∞(W⊙F)tb(0)
is a polarization, for all initial opinion vectors b(0). We say that W⊙F induces a non-zero polarization
when W⊙F induces a polarization and limt→∞(W⊙F)tb(0) 6= 0 for some initial opinion vectors b(0).
Theorem 4.1. LetW⊙F ∈ SLS(S0). Assume thatW⊙F is strongly connected (since A is symmetric,
we might also simply say ‘connected’) and aperiodic. Then:
(i) W⊙F induces a polarization (that is not always zero) if and only if W⊙F is opposition bipartite.
(ii) W ⊙ F is divergent if and only if W ⊙ F is reverse opposition bipartite.
(iii) W⊙F induces a neutral17 consensus if and only ifW⊙F is neither opposition bipartite nor reverse
opposition bipartite.
For better understanding, we give alternative characterizations of conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem
4.1, which follow from the theorem and its proof. Namely, we find that:
(i) If and only if W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite, the following holds: b(∞) = limt→∞(W ⊙ F)b(0)
exists for all b(0) ∈ Sn and b(∞) is then always either the zero vector (e.g., when b(0) is the zero
vector; but it is not the zero vector for all b(0) ∈ Sn) or is some polarization vector where each
entry is a > 0 or −a. Moreover, when Wi,Out(i) > 0 for some i ∈ [n], then, if b(∞) is a non-zero
polarization vector, both a and −a are components of b(0); otherwise b(∞) is always a consensus,
as in the standard DeGroot model.
(ii) If and only if W⊙F is reverse opposition bipartite, the following holds: limt→∞(W⊙F)b(0) does
not exist for all b(0) in Sn. Moreover, when it exists it is the zero vector.
The fact that polarization requires ‘exact’ balance (opposition bipartiteness) and admits not a ‘grain
of imbalancedness’, as stated in Theorem 4.1 and exemplified in Figure 4, may appear odd since one
might expect, in reality, small perturbations to balance — e.g., small-scale intra-group antagonisms or
individual friendships among enemies — to be the rule rather than the exception, particularly in large
enough systems. We note that this result is closely connected to the continuous opinion spectrum and
the corresponding averaging updating that we have considered in this section. If one thinks that reality
is better perceived of as discrete, with weighted majority voting as a more plausible opinion updating
mechanism, then it is apparent that the discrete model is clearly robust against small such perturbations,
so that polarizing viewpoints can be Nash equilibria in this case even when the underlying networks exhibit
(marginal) imbalancedness.
We also note that our results may be generalized to periodic graphs (those that are not aperiodic)
and to graphs that are not connected. We leave this to future work.
4.2 Social influence and opinion leadership
In DeGroot learning, one of the important questions has been that of opinion leadership: whose agents’
initial opinions have most impact upon resulting limiting (long-run) opinions and how does this depend
on the network structure in which the agents are embedded. In the context of connected SLS(S0)
networks as we have defined above, this question admits an elegant solution in our extended DeGroot
model with in-group/out-group relationships. Namely, if the network is reverse opposition bipartite,
the updating operator diverges (for at least some initial opinion vectors) and opinion leadership is thus
not well-defined. If, in contrast, the network is opposition bipartite and aperiodic, opinion leadership is
determined by eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972) exactly in the same way as in the original DeGroot
model, except that a plus or minus sign indicates the group membership of the agents. Finally, if none of
those two conditions hold, then no agent is influential, since agents will converge to a fixed-point of the
deviation function no matter their initial opinions. The opposition bipartite case is the focus of the next
theorem.
17Here, we call a consensus (c, . . . , c) neutral if D(c) = c. For soft opposition on S0, c = 0.
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Theorem 4.2. Let W ⊙ F ∈ SLS(S0). Assume that W ⊙ F is strongly connected and aperiodic. Then
the following are equivalent:
(i) There exists a unique (nonnegative) left unit eigenvector s of |A|, the matrix with entries |Aij |,
whose entries sum to 1 such that each agent holds one of two long-run opinion values a and b
(b = −a), given by
a =
∑
j∈[n]
g(j)sjbj(0),
b =
∑
j∈[n]
(−g(j))sjbj(0),
where g(j) ∈ {±1}.
(ii) W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite.
Since in case of opposition bipartite and aperiodic strongly connected networks there are two long-run
opinion values and an agent j’s ‘influence’ on each of them is g(j)sj and −g(j)sj, respectively, where
g(j) ∈ {±1}, we may speak of agent j’s absolute power |vj | = |g(j)sj | = |−g(j)sj| = sj . Thus, in
summary, the last theorem and our previous discussion lead to the following characterization for strongly
connected networks W ⊙ F ∈ SLS(S0):
(i) Each agent’s absolute power |vi| is given by |vi| = si where s is the unique left unit eigenvector of
|A| with normalization
∑
i∈[n] si = 1 if and only if W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite.
(ii) Opinion leadership is not (well-)defined if and only if W ⊙ F is reverse opposition bipartite.
(iii) Each agent’s power is given by vi = 0 if and only if W ⊙ F is neither opposition bipartite nor
reverse opposition bipartite.
It is noteworthy that in case (i), absolute power is independent of the kinds of relationships between
agents and only depends on their intensities. In other words, an agent may also be prominent when
she attracts strong negative links. When society partitions into several subsocities, these results may be
applied independently to each of them.
5 Concluding remarks
Opinions are important in an economic context (and other contexts) since they shape the demand for
products, set the political course, and guide, in general, socio-economic behavior. Models of opinion
dynamics describe how individuals form opinions or beliefs about an underlying state or a discussion
topic. Typically, in the social networks literature, subjects may communicate with other individuals,
their peers, in this context, enabling them to aggregate dispersed information. Bayesian models of
opinion formation assume that agents form their opinions in a fully rational manner and have an accurate
‘model of the world’ at their disposal, both of which are questionable and unrealistic assumptions for
actual social learning processes of human individuals. Non-Bayesian models, and most prominently the
classical DeGroot model of opinion formation, while also not unproblematic (cf. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar,
2011), posit that agents employ simple ‘rule-of-thumb’ heuristics to integrate the opinions of others.
Unfortunately, both the non-Bayesian and Bayesian paradigms typically lead individuals to a consensus,
which apparently contradicts the facts as people disagree with others on many issues of (everyday) life.
In the context of DeGroot learning models, some approaches can address this, either by assuming a
homophily principle whereby agents limit their communication to those who hold similar opinions as
themselves or by introducing stubborn agents, modeling, e.g., opinion leaders, who never update their
opinions. Both approaches are, again, debatable since they assume a complete lack of flow of information
between some classes of agents (from some time onwards). In addition, models based on homophily and
stubborn agents both ignore negative relationships between individuals as potential sources for conflict
and disagreement.
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In the current work, we have investigated opinion dynamics under out-group discrimination (in-group
bias) as such a potentially alternative explanation for disagreement. In our setup, agents are driven
by two forces: they want to adjust their opinions to match those of the agents of their in-group and, in
addition, they want to adjust their opinions to match the ‘inverse’ of those of the agents of their out-group.
Best responses in this setting lead us to a DeGroot-like opinion updating process in which agents form
their next period opinions via weighted averages of their neighbors’ (possibly inverted) opinion signals.
Unlike in the standard DeGroot model where opinions may converge to arbitrary consensus opinion
profiles, in our model only neutral consensus opinion profiles may be attained in the long-run, that is,
consensus vectors where the consensus opinion is a fixed-point of each agent’s deviation function (modeling
the mode of opposition between agents). Thus, if there exists no opinion that is ‘globally’ neutral in
this sense, our model predicts persistent disagreement provided that negative relations between agents
are sufficiently strong. When we specialize our model to undirected networks containing no self-loops
and where the only allowable deviation function is ‘soft opposition’, we derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for bi-polarization in connected societies. These say that long-run opinions bi-polarize if and
only if the underlying network wherein agents communicate satisfies ‘opposition bipartiteness’: it consists
of two groups of agents exhibiting positive within-group links and negative between-group links. We also
investigate social influence in this special case, that is, the question of whose initial opinions matter most
for resulting long-run opinions. We find that in opposition bipartite networks (satisfying aperiodicity),
opinion leadership, in terms of absolute power, is determined by eigenvector centrality exactly in the same
way as in the standard DeGroot model. This means that an agent is prominent to the degree that she is
interlinked with prominent agents; it is noteworthy that even strong negative ties increase prominence.
Finally, considering the question of wisdom (Golub and Jackson, 2010; Jadbabaie et al., 2012; Buechel,
Hellmann, and Klo¨ßner, 2015), that is, whether agents can (jointly) learn the true state of nature of their
discussion topic, provided that such a truth exists, we observe the following. The case for wisdom is a
weak one in our model since negative ties typically prevent consensus formation, so clearly not everybody
can be wise in the long-run. This holds even when agents are initially perfectly informed in the sense that
their initial beliefs coincide with truth. In particular, if agents (multi-)polarize, then at most one group
of agents may be wise in the long-run, but due to the mutual dependence of long-run beliefs, we might
suspect none to be.18 Ultimately, this result must be interpreted by reference to the rationality of the
agents involved. The standard interpretation of DeGroot learners is that of na¨ıve individuals susceptible
to persuasion bias. Golub and Jackson (2010) show that such agents can still learn the true state of
nature under not too demanding conditions. Jadbabaie et al. (2012) show that slightly more rationality
increases the case for wisdom. In contrast, we show that an additional bias such as in-group bias may
significantly worsen this case.
Concerning future research directions within our context, both weight links and opposition links
between agents, W and F, have been assumed exogenous in the current work. Prospectively, it might
be worthwhile to consider endogenous link formation processes. In particular, the origin and evolution of
out-group relations, and their interdependence with agents’ opinions and external factors, such as, most
importantly, external truth, might be of interest.
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Appendix A Definitions, theorems, and proofs
Sections A.1 and A.2 review notation and concepts for graphs and matrices, respectively. Section A.3
states basic results on signed social networks from Altafini (2013). Finally, Section A.4 provides the proofs
18In particular, observe that an agent’s wisdom is expected to decrease in her amount of in-group bias (i.e., how strongly
she discriminates against out-group individuals) provided that out-group individuals’ opinions are close to truth, because
this controls how strongly she desires to match the ‘opposite’ of truth. From a reverse perspective, her wisdom is expected
to increase in her out-groups’ biases.
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of our own results in this work.
A.1 Graphs
Definition A.1 ((Weighted) Network). A network, or graph, is a tuple G = (V,E) where V is a finite set
and E ⊆ V ×V = {(u, v) |u, v ∈ V }. We call V the vertices or nodes of graph G and E the edges or links
of G. Moreover, we call the network G weighted if there exist weights wuv for each edge (u, v) ∈ E.19
In a multigraph, instead of having only one link type between nodes, there may exist multiple link
types. The networks investigated in this work may be considered multigraphs with exactly two types of
links, one denoting intensity of connection and one denoting kind of connection.
Definition A.2. A walk in a network G = (V,E) is a sequence of nodes i1, i2, . . . , iK , not necessarily
distinct, such that (ik, ik+1) ∈ E for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}. A path is a walk consisting of distinct nodes.
A cycle is a walk i1, . . . , iK such that i1 = iK . The length of cylce i1, . . . , iK is defined to be K − 1. A
cycle is called simple if the only node appearing twice is i1 = iK .
Remark A.1. We use the same terminology — ‘strongly connected’, ‘aperiodic’, etc. — whether we
speak of (our) multigraphs, in which there exist exactly two types of relationships between agents, or
ordinary graphs. In the case of multigraphs, we refer to their underlying ordinary graphs. We also use
the same terminology for n× n matrices A and their underlying graphs ([n], {(i, j) |Aij 6= 0}).
A.2 Matrix and Markov chain theory
We first state one of the main theorems for the DeGroot updates (2.6) in the non-opposition case (cf.
Golub and Jackson (2010)). We assume that W is row-stochastic.
Theorem A.1. Consider the opinion updating process (2.6) with Fij = F for all i, j ∈ [n], where F is
the identity function. Let the multigraph corresponding to the operator W ⊙ F = W — an ordinary
graph — be strongly connected and aperiodic. Then W ⊙ F is convergent and induces a consensus.
In case W ⊙ F is an affine-linear map, whether or not W ⊙ F converges can be fully determined by
reference the notion of eigenvalues, which we introduce now.
Definition A.3. Let A ∈ Rn×n be an n × n matrix. An eigenvalue of A is any value λ ∈ C such that
Ax = λx for some non-zero vector x ∈ Rn. The set of distinct eigenvalues of matrix A is called its
spectrum and denoted by σ(A). By ρ(A), we denote the spectral radius of A, the largest absolute value
of all the eigenvalues of A, that is, ρ(A) = max{
∣∣λ∣∣ |λ ∈ σ(A)}.
Theorem A.2 (Meyer, 2000, p.630). For A ∈ Rn×n, limt→∞At exists if and only if
ρ(A) < 1, or else,
ρ(A) = 1 and λ = 1 is the only eigenvalue on the unit circle, and λ = 1 is semisimple,
where an eigenvalue is called semisimple if its algebraic multiplicity equals its geometric multiplicity. The
algebraic multiplicity of an eigenvalue λ is the number of times it is repeated as a root of the characteristic
polynomial χ(λ) = det (A− λIn), where In is the n × n identity matrix. The geometric multiplicity is
the number of linearly independent eigenvectors associated with λ.
A.3 Signed networks
Here, we assume social networks W ⊙ F such that Fij ∈ {F,D} where D is soft opposition on S0, i.e.,
D(x) = −x. Such operators admit a matrix representation A in which each entry has a positive or
negative sign (or is zero), see Proposition A.2. We assume that A is connected and aperiodic.
Lemma A.1. Let W ⊙ F be such that Aii = 0 and Aij = Aji. Then, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite if
and only if there exists a diagonal matrix ∆ such that ∆A∆ = |A|, where |A| denotes the matrix with
entries |Aij |.
19Weights may typically be real numbers but we more generally allow them to be arbitrary mathematical objects.
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Lemma A.2. Let |A| = ∆A∆ as in Lemma A.1. Then A and |A| have the same eigenvalues with the
same multiplicities.
Lemma A.3. Let W ⊙ F be such that Aii = 0 and Aij = Aji. Then, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite if
and only if λ = 1 is an eigenvalue of A.
Proof. Altafini (2013), Lemma 1, shows that 0 ∈ σ(L) if and only if A is opposition bipartite where
L = I−A. Clearly, 1 ∈ σ(A) ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ σ(L).
A.4 Proofs of main results
Proposition A.1. Let W ⊙ F be an arbitrary social network such that Fij ∈ {F,Di}, for all i, j ∈ [n].
Then, for all c ∈ S,
c ∈
⋂
(i,j)∈[n]×[n]
Fix(Fij) =⇒ (c, . . . , c) ∈ Fix(W ⊙ F).
Moreover, let A = {i ∈ [n] |Wi,Out(i) > C0} denote the set of agents whose weight mass assigned to
out-group members exceeds a particular threshold C0; in the discrete case, C0 =
1
2 , and in the continuous
case, C0 = 0. Then, for any i ∈ A, it holds that
c /∈ Fix(Di) =⇒ (c, . . . , c) /∈ Fix(W ⊙ F).
Combining both implications yields that
P1[Fix(W ⊙ F) ∩ C] =
⋂
i∈A
Fix(Di).
Remark A.2. If D is allowed to vary across both i and j, then c /∈ Fix(Dij) does not necessarily imply
that (c, . . . , c) /∈ Fix(W ⊙ F). To see this, assume, for example, that in a three-player society {1, 2, 3}
agent 1 has Out(1) = {2, 3} with W12 = W13 =
1
4 . For a c ∈ S = R, let D12(c) = c + ǫ and let
D13(c) = c − ǫ, for some ǫ > 0. Assuming that Out(2) = Out(3) = ∅, we have (W ⊙ F)c = c, since, in
particular, for agent 1,
W11c+W12D12(c) +W13D13(c) =
1
2
c+
1
4
(c+ ǫ) +
1
4
(c− ǫ) = c.
Proof of Proposition A.1. We only provide the proof for the continuous model. The discrete model proof
is similar.
If c = Fij(c) for some c ∈ S and all (i, j) ∈ [n] × [n], then clearly — letting c = (c, . . . , c) —
(W ⊙ F)c = c by the definition of W ⊙ F since for each agent i ∈ [n],
[
(W ⊙ F)c
]
i
=
n∑
j=1
WijFij(c) = c
∑
j∈[n]
Wij = c = [c]i.
Conversely, let c 6= Di(c) for some c ∈ S and some i ∈ A. If c = (c, . . . , c) were a fixed-point of
W ⊙ F, then
c =
∑
j∈Out(i)
WijDi(c) +
∑
j∈In(i)
Wijc = Di(c)Wi,Out(i) + c(1−Wi,Out(i)),
which implies that
Wi,Out(i)c =Wi,Out(i)Di(c).
This is a contradiction since Wi,Out(i) > 0 by assumption.
Lemma A.4. LetW⊙F be an arbitrary social network. Assume that eitherW⊙F refers to the discrete
model or that each function Fij in F is continuous. Then:
Lim(W ⊙ F) = Fix(W ⊙ F).
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Proof of Lemma A.4. The relation Fix(W ⊙ F) ⊆ Lim(W ⊙ F) is obvious. Conversely, if each Fij is
continuous, then W ⊙ F is a continuous operator and thus, each limit vector b(∞) ∈ Lim(W ⊙ F) is a
fixed-point of W ⊙ F:
(W ⊙ F)b(∞) = (W ⊙ F) lim
t→∞
(W ⊙ F)tb(0) = lim
t→∞
(W ⊙ F)t+1b(0) = b(∞).
If S is finite and W ⊙ F is convergent (for b(0)), then b(∞) is a fixed-point of W ⊙ F no matter the
specification of F.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. This is an application of Proposition A.1 and Lemma A.4.
Proposition A.2. Let D be of the form ax+ b for some constants a and b, and let Fij ∈ {F,D}. Then,
W ⊙ F is an affine-linear operator of the form Ax+ d, that is, (W ⊙ F)(x) = Ax+ d for all x ∈ Sn.
Proof of Proposition A.2. For each agent i ∈ [n], we have[
(W ⊙ F)x
]
i
=
∑
j∈In(i)
Wijxj +
∑
j∈Out(i)
WijD(xj) =
∑
j∈In(i)
Wijxj +
∑
j∈Out(i)
Wij(axj + b)
=
∑
j∈In(i)
Wijxj +
∑
j∈Out(i)
aWijxj + b
∑
j∈Out(i)
Wij
=
∑
j∈In(i)
Wijxj +
∑
j∈Out(i)
(aWij)xj + bWi,Out(i).
Thus, we can set A ∈ Rn×n, d ∈ Rn with
Aij =
{
Wij if Fij = F,
aWij if Fij = D,
di = bWi,Out(i). (A.1)
Lemma A.5. Let W ⊙ F be an arbitrary social network with Fij ∈ {F,D} for an arbitrary deviation
function D. Then, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite if and only if W ⊙ F¯ is reverse opposition bipartite,
where F¯ is the matrix with entries F¯ij = ¬Fij , whereby we define ¬D = F and ¬F = D.
Proof. See Figure 2, in Section 3, for a graphical proof.
Remark A.3. If D is soft opposition on S0, let (A,0) be the representation ofW⊙F. Then, the lemma
specializes to the statement that, in this situation, (A,0) is opposition bipartite if and only if (−A,0) is
reverse opposition bipartite.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. (i) If W ⊙ F induces a (non-zero) polarization, then, necessarily, 1 ∈ σ(A). But,
1 ∈ σ(A) ⇐⇒ W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite by Lemma A.3. Conversely, let W ⊙ F be opposition
bipartite. Then, |A| and A are isospectral, that is, they have the same eigenvalues and with the same
associated multiplicities by Lemmas A.1 and A.2. Now, (⋆) a strongly connected and aperiodic row-
stochastic matrix |A| has exactly one eigenvalue on the unit circle, λ = 1, with algebraic and geometric
multiplicity of 1. Therefore, A has exactly one eigenvalue on the unit circle, λ = 1, with algebraic
and geometric multiplicity of 1 and, consequently, converges by Theorem A.2. Moreover, since each
polarization vector x with xi = 1 if i ∈ N1 and xi = −1 if i ∈ N2 satisfies Ax = (W ⊙ F)x = x when
W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite with partition (N1,N2), W ⊙ F induces a polarization that is not always
zero (note that the geometric multiplicity of λ = 1 of A is 1).
Part (ii) “⇐” follows from the fact that 1 ∈ σ(A) ⇐⇒ W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite and the
fact that W ⊙ F with representation A is opposition bipartite if and only if −A is reverse opposition
bipartite by Lemma A.5. Thus, −1 ∈ σ(A) ⇐⇒ W ⊙ F is reverse opposition bipartite, whence A
diverges by Theorem A.2. Conversely, when W ⊙ F diverges, then ρ(A) = 1 (we have ρ(A) ≤ 1 for all
such matrices A as we consider since |A| =W is row-stochastic and therefore, ρ(A) ≤ ρ(|A|) = 1). If 1
were in σ(A), then W⊙F were opposition bipartite and W⊙F would converge by (i). Hence, 1 /∈ σ(A)
and consequently, −1 ∈ σ(A) — since a symmetric matrix A has no complex eigenvalues. Consequently,
W ⊙ F is reverse opposition bipartite.
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Finally, for part (iii), if W ⊙ F is neither opposition bipartite nor reverse opposition bipartite, then,
by our above reasonings, ±1 /∈ σ(A), and since A is symmetric, A has no complex eigenvalues, whence
ρ(A) < 1. Thus, W ⊙ F induces the unique neutral consensus (0, . . . , 0). Conversely, if W ⊙ F induces
the neutral consensus (0, . . . , 0) for each initial belief vector b(0), then necessarily ρ(A) < 1. Hence,
W ⊙ F is neither opposition bipartite nor reverse opposition bipartite.
Now, fact (⋆) is a classical theorem for row-stochastic matrices, which is, e.g., based on the famous
Perron-Frobenius theorem; in our context, it is given by combining Theorems A.1 and A.2, for example.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. (i) =⇒ (ii): For an appropriate initial opinion vector, let each agent hold limiting
opinions a 6= 0 or −a as indicated. Place agents in a group N1 resp. N2 depending on whether they hold
limit opinions a or −a, respectively. We show that (N1,N2) forms an opposition bipartite partition of
[n]. Take i, i′ ∈ N1 and assume that Aii′ < 0 (i.e., i and i′ are enemies). Then, since the limit opinion
vector is a fixed-point of A, we have:
a(±Ai1 + · · ·+Aii′ + · · ·+±Ain) = a.
But this cannot be, since Aii′ + C < |Aii′ | + C′ = 1 where C =
∑
j 6=i′ ±Aij and C
′ =
∑
j 6=i′ |Aij |.
Similarly, we can show that no two agents i ∈ N1, j ∈ N2 are friends of each other. Hence, W ⊙ F is
opposition bipartite.
(ii) =⇒ (i): Conversely, let W ⊙ F be opposition bipartite and aperiodic. By Lemma A.1, W ⊙ F
is opposition bipartite if and only if there exists a diagonal matrix ∆ (with entries ±1) such that |A| =
∆A∆. We know that
lim
t→∞
|A|t p = s⊺p1
for all p ∈ Sn (see, e.g., Golub and Jackson, 2010, Proposition 1) and that ∆−1 =∆. Therefore,
lim
t→∞
Atp =∆ lim
t→∞
|A|t (∆p) =∆s⊺(∆p)1.
This proves the theorem.
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